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Extant diplomatic and military studies about Greek 
wartime politics vis a vis Britain and the dominions of 
Australia and New Zealand have been steadfastly fixed 
upon the campaigns of early 1941 and the events leading 
up to them. Missing is the ongoing involvement of New 
Zealand in Greek matters during the post-Crete period of 
the Second World War. This paper examines the dynam-
ics, constraints and degree of solidity of the New Zealand 
government and military leadership in Greek matters 
during the period 1942-1944. These contentious years 
have been much studied by scholars of Anglo-Greek re-
lations1, Greek Civil War, a politicised and recalcitrant 
Greek military2, social and political impact of the armed 
resistance3, extent and definition of what constitutes col-
laboration4 and the horror of occupation.5 The war was 
a cruel catalyst that brought tragedy and destruction. It 
also brought forward aspirations for change from the old 
pre-war order, and lasting alteration to socio-political 
makeup of the country. The Pacific Dominion of New 
Zealand had a presence in this maelstrom.
Overview of New Zealand Interaction
The catastrophes of early 1941 dominate the New Zea-
land discourse about its involvement with Greece. Allo-
cating culpability for the disastrous mainland venture 
1 Procopis Papastratis, British Policy towards Greece during 
the Second World War 1941-1944, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984); Panagiotis Dimitrakis, Greece and 
the English – British Diplomacy and the Kings of Greece, 
(London: Taurus, 2009).
2 Hagen Fleischer, “Anomolies in the Greek Middle East 
Forces”, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, 5:3 (1978), pp. 
5-36; David Syrett, “British and the Greek Naval Incident 
in Chatham, 1944”, Journal of Hellenic Diaspora, 15:1-2 
(1988), pp. 49-69; Evangelos Spyropoulos, Greek Military 
(1909-1941) and the Greek mutinies in the Middle East 
(1941-1944), (New York: East European Monographs, 1993); 
Mark C. Jones, “Misunderstood and Forgotten: Greek Naval 
Mutiny of April 1944”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 
20:2 (2002), pp. 367-97; Andre Gerolymatos, “Road to Au-
thoritarianism: Greek Army in Politics 1935-1949”, Journal 
of the Hellenic Diaspora, 35:1 (2009), pp. 7-25.
3 To cite a few examples, John Hondros, Occupation and Re-
sistance: Greek Agony 1941-44, (New York: Pella, 1983); 
Andre Gerolymatos, Guerrilla Warfare & Espionage in 
Greece 1940-1944, (New York: Pella, 1992); Richard Clogg, 
Greece, 1940-1949: Occupation, Resistance, Civil War: a 
Documentary History, (Bassingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002); Andre Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, Black Terror: 
the Greek Civil War and the origins of Soviet-American ri-
valry, 1943-1949, (New York: Basic Books, 2004).
4 Richter used extensive primary records to analyse collabo-
ration involving British supported partisans: Heinz Richter, 
“Lanz, Zervas and the British Liaison Officers”, South Slav 
Journal, 12,1-2 (1989), pp. 38-65; Hondros looks at British 
policy and the Greek raised Security Batallions. Hondros, 
John Louis Hondros, “‘Too Weighty a Weapon: Britain and 
the Greek Security Battallions’, Journal of the Hellenic Di-
aspora, 15,1-2 (1988) 1943-1944”, pp. 33-47.
5 Keith Lowe, Savage Continent: Europe and the Aftermath 
of World War II, (London: Viking, 2012); Mark Mazower, 
Inside Hitler’s Greece: the Experience of Occupation, 1941-
44, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).
and loss of Crete is a particularly contentious issue in 
both the literature6 and the public arena.7 The degree of 
Bri tish deceit versus Dominion “innocence” and “vic-
tim hood”8, with the weaker and smaller dominions de-
fending themselves against the imposition of imperial 
prerogatives9 and, in terms of New Zealand, its idea-
lism10, are common themes. 
Included in this discourse are the initial strains within 
the New Zealand national leadership. At its most acute, 
it might have seen the dismissal of General Bernard 
Frey berg as commander of the New Zealand forces by 
New Zealand Prime Minister, Peter Fraser. The latter 
thought the soldier had not guarded (by communicating 
his misgivings to Wellington) New Zealand interests 
6 National pride has a discernible presence in the discussions 
over Crete. For example, Beevor made a pointed attack on 
the New Zealand commander on Crete, Freyberg, in: An-
thony Beevor, Crete: Battle and Resistance, (London: John 
Murray, 2005). In a review that touched upon the original 
edition, New Zealand’s state war historian, Ian McGibbon 
judged Beevor’s argument as a “simplistic notion”: Ian Mc-
Gibbon, “Review of Oxford Companion to Military His-
tory”, New Zealand International Review, XXVII (March/
April 2002), p. 2. Two recent populist titles are David Filer, 
Death from the Skies – New Zealand’s Role in the loss of 
Crete, (Auckland: David Bateman, 2010); Ron Palenski, 
Men of Valour, (Auckland: Hodder Moa, 2013). The former 
places the blame of inaction on New Zealand commanders 
under Freyberg. Palenski veers away from allotting blame 
and defends the major the two who have been held responsi-
ble in the New Zealand literature. 
7 In New Zealand at the time of the 70th commemoration of 
the Battle of Crete, there were several items in the popular 
press. Veteran Sandy Thomas, whose memoirs Dare to be 
Free (London: Cassell, 2005) included Crete, publicly stated 
it was indeed the New Zealanders who were at fault. Tim 
Donoghue, “Officer breaks rank over the Battle of Crete”, 
Dominion Post, 14 May 2011. Matthew Wright dismissed 
discussing the issue, preferring to talk about the long term 
victory and that the New Zealanders had their revenge 
killing in Northern Italy against the German paratroopers. 
Matthew Wright, “Battle for Crete part of a slow-evolving 
Kiwi legacy”, Dominion Post, 24 May 2011. 
8 Ian Wards, “Balkan Dilemma” in: John Crawford (ed.), Kia 
kaha: New Zealand in the Second World War, (Auckland: 
Ox ford University Press, 2000); Peter Ewer, Forgotten 
AN ZACs: Campaign in Greece 1941, (Melbourne: Scribe, 
2008). For more Australia centred studies see David Day, 
Men zies & Churchill at War, (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 
1986); Graham Freudenberg, Churchill and Australia, (Syd-
ney: Pan Macmillan, 2009).
9 Besides the ongoing interplay between Britain and the do-
minions, the mechanism of the charter given Australian and 
New Zealand commanders by their governments is often 
cited in this respect. W.E. Murphy, “Blamey’s and Frey-
berg’s ‘Charters’: a study in civil-military and Com mon-
wealth relations”, Political Science, 16: 2 (1964), pp. 23-51; 
Forty-five years later, Hensley considers it as a key factor. 
Gerald Hensley, Beyond the Battlefield: New Zealand and 
its Allies, 1939-45, (Auckland: Viking, 2009).
10 Wood’s state history for example agues: “The emphasis on 
moral issues was characteristic of New Zealand policy, and 
it was one of the factors leading the Government to accept a 
really grave military risk”, F.L.W. Wood, New Zealand peo-
ple at war: political and external affairs, (Wellington: War 
History Branch, 1958), p. 186.
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well enough over the mainland expedition. The ensuing 
loss of Crete, under his command, added to thoughts of 
replacing the General. However, in the New Zealand 
publication record, both the received11 and revisionist12 
arguments accept this initial questioning as a result of 
still gestating civil/military relationship and that, for the 
remainder of the war, Prime Minister Peter Fraser and 
his military commander in the field, General Bernard 
Frey berg, enjoyed an exemplary working relationship. 
It is one that also included consideration for their com-
mon fighting soldiers. As shown later, this perspective 
is severely jolted when one examines their actions over 
the question of Greece in following 1941. 
New Zealand Publication Record and Post-Crete 
New Zealand had an ongoing presence in the years 
after 1941 when new forces emerged in occupied and 
non-occupied Greece to challenge the old order, and 
the operation of Anglo-Greek relations to the satisfac-
tion of British. The extensive involvement is suggested 
by just a few telegrams in a published volume, isolated 
paragraphs and memoirs. These include provision of 
training and anticipated shared military operations in 
the North African and Middle East theatres13 during a 
time when the Greek military was experiencing internal 
factional fighting in the officer corps and the emergence 
of a mass-based left-wing soldiers’ movement.14 Years 
later, in 1944, political agitation in another joint force 
was also raised.15 The remainder are very brief mentions 
in official campaign and unit histories.16
11 For example, see W.G. Stevens, Freyberg the Man, (Wel-
ling ton: A.H. & A.W. Reed, 1965), ch. 5. Stevens was one 
of Freyberg’s most senior officers and, besides being on 
service in the field, had been seconded to the New Zealand 
Prime Minister’s Dept. during the pre-war years. He writes 
a largely positive view of Freyberg. His specific criticism 
about his commander’s approach to diplomatic management 
probably stems from this exposure to the government 
decision making process; “After some initial difficulties 
… [Fraser] established a good working relationship with 
Freyberg”, Ian McGibbon (ed.), Oxford Companion to New 
Zealand Military History, (Auck land: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), p. 181; in their biography of Fraser Bassett 
and King state: “What Freyberg and Fraser had so far failed 
to convey was their apprehension about the Greek venture 
to each other. Subsequently, both deeply regretted this.” 
Mi chael Bassett, Michael King, To mor row Comes the Sun, 
(Auck land/London: Penguin, 2000), p. 209. 
12 Belich, the major revisionist New Zealand historian, im-
plicitly accepts Freyberg and Fraser working in tandem: “In 
the end, both Freyberg and Fraser were seldom prepared to 
override the British high command, if it really insisted, over 
the use of New Zealand troops.” James Belich, Paradise 
Reforged A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to 
the Year 2000, (Auckland: Penguin, 2001), p. 284. 
13 Documents Relating to New Zealand’s Participation in the Se-
cond World War 1939–45: Volume II, Wellington, (Wel ling-
ton: War History Branch, 1951). The communications are in-
troduced throughout he paper. This monograph also includes 
telegrams concerning the Aegean disaster in late 1943 and the 
involvement of the New Zealand Squadron of the Long Range 
Desert Group. As will be shown later, this episode is discussed 
later but is tangential to the main thrust of this paper.
14 W.G. Stevens, Problems of 2NZEF, (Wellington: War His-
tory Branch, 1958), pp. 135-136.
15 Documents Relating to New Zealand’s Participation in the 
Second World War 1939–45: Volume II. 
16 Robin Kay, N.C. Phillips, Italy. Volume II. From Cassino to 
Individual New Zealand soldiers also operated with-
in Occupied Greek territory as part of clandestine Bri-
tish organisations. New Zealand officers and soldiers 
were on loan from their country’s major military unit, 
the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF) 
to SOE (Special Operations Executive).
In terms of this connection, there is a thin official 
volume on British Special Operations Executive (SOE) 
in Greece17 as well as autobiographical accounts by in-
dividual members.18 
None of these publications provides a single nar-
rative of the ongoing involvement of New Zealand in 
Greek affairs. There are fragments revealing that the 
interaction took place during contentious Anglo-Greek 
relations. Nowhere is there an assessment of the New 
Zealand leadership during this period. 
Methodology 
As suggested by the preceding text, the examination 
will pivot around the Freyberg-Fraser nexus. That is, I 
have not found anything to challenge the popular New 
Zealand view that, due to their dominant personalities 
and possibly the small size of the Dominion’s civil-
military infrastructure, these two individuals essentially 
steered the strategic direction of the military war effort.19
Trieste, (Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, 1967), 
p. 215-216. The author states: “At the request of the Greek 
Government and with the approval of the New Zealand Gov-
ernment, the Greek Mountain Brigade was placed under the 
aegis of the New Zealand Division. The brigade was com-
posed mainly of men whom war had made exiles; it had been 
recruited from the reliable elements of two brigades of the 
Greek Royal Army which had mutinied for political reasons 
while stationed in the Middle East.”; D. Sinclair, 19 Bat-
ta lion and Armoured Regiment, (Wellington: War History 
Branch, 1954), p. 251 notes the Greeks relieved the battalion 
in Syria; pp. 453-54 describes the Greek and New Zealand 
attack on Rimini. The Italian connection is also mentioned 
in J.F. Cody, New Zealand Engineers, Middle East, (Wel-
lington: Dept of Internal Affairs, 1961); Jim Henderson, 22 
Bat ta lion, (Wellington: War History Branch, 1958); D.J.C. 
Pring le, W.A. Glue, 20 Battalion and Armoured Regiment 
(Wellington: War History Branch, 1957); J.F. Cody, 28 (Ma-
ori) Battalion, (Wellington: War History Branch, 1956); T. 
Stout, M. Duncan, New Zealand medical services in Middle 
East and Italy, (Wellington: War History Branch, 1956), p. 
321 mentions the Syrian episode.
17 M.B. McGlynn, Special Service in Greece, (Wellington: 
War History Branch, 1953).
18 The relevant monographs are Bill Jordan, Conquest Without 
Victory, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1969); Arthur Ed-
monds, With Greek Guerrillas; Putaruru: Author, c. 1998; 
John Mulgan, Report on Experience, (London: Frontline 
Books, 2010). Mulgan was actually a New Zealander who 
had joined the British Army at the outbreak of war. As such 
his inclusion in this study cannot be justified except as to 
provide contextual details. He died in early 1945 and his 
manuscript was subsequently published.
19 Peter Fraser’s authoritarian style of leadership during the 
war was indicative of his leadership style and influence in 
general. One biography of him stated in 2000 that: “From 
1940 to 1949 he was the New Zealand government and the 
La bour Party … He dominated his colleagues in a manner 
that no Labour leader has done before or since”, Bassett, 
King, op cit., p. 10. Although after Crete, Freyberg is cre-
dit ed with being inclusive in operational decision making, 
Frey berg’s approach to maintaining his diplomatic umbilical 
cord to Wellington dovetails with Fraser’s authoritarian 
methods. In contrast to his consultative form of military 
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While the New Zealanders were interacting with 
both Greeks and the British, the machinations within 
these latter camps, and the interplay between each other, 
is given a secondary level of exposure. This is due to the 
New Zealand perspective taken, as well as the key focus 
– the interaction between the two leaders, even when 
what they were aware of some of the obvious risks in 
participating in Greek-related scenarios. That being 
said, an episode in Italy, during late 1944, does include 
more contextual sketching than does the treatment of 
previous years. This is a result of the New Zealand de-
liberation and action over Greek-related events being at 
its greatest then.
Research Question
Given the preceding, the formulated research question 
is: How did the New Zealand leadership respond when 
its military was exposed to factious and often violent 
Greek wartime politics between 1942 and 1944?
Sources
Any examination of New Zealand in the Second World 
War is hampered by the poor practice of its govern-
ment in using and/or retaining written records. This 
even extended to non-recording of Cabinet meetings 
and certain sessions in the parliament. The former was 
addressed to an extent when a change in government 
in 1949 led to cabinet minutes being taken.20 The latter 
gaps were never filled.21
In addition to the above is a related larger impedi ment 
to empirically based research. This is the widespread de-
struction of official documents in Cairo in response to 
Rom mel’s threatening offensive in mid-1942.22
As this is a New Zealand perspective, archives 
and manuscript depositories in New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom provide nearly all the primary ma-
terial. Although visits were made to Athens-based re-
positories, such as the Benaki Archives, General State 
leader ship with subordinates, Freyberg, according to one 
of his most senior officers, sometimes irritated his staff 
because: “throughout the war he kept this side of his duties, 
his relations with the Government, almost entirely under 
his personal control and did not often consult anybody.” 
W.G. Stevens, Freyberg the Man, (Wellington; A.H. & A.W. 
Reed, 1965), p 106. See pp. 84-85 concerning Freyberg’s 
management of officers. With Freyberg Fraser is depicted 
as being consultative but with everyone else he “pushed and 
shoved, bargained and coerced”, Keith Eunson, Mirrors on 
the Hill: Reflection on New Zealand’s Political Leaders, 
(Pal mer ston North: Dunmore Press, 2001), p. 17.
20 As a memorandum to the incoming Prime Minister indi cat ed, 
“At the moment there is no minute of Cabinet discussion; the 
decision is only noted. In other Commonwealth countries, 
a procedure has been developed whereby brief minutes are 
taken.” Memorandum for Prime Minister, Cabinet-Review 
of Procedure, September 1949, p. 3, MS-Papers-6759-050 
Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs (A15) Alister McIntosh 
Papers, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington (ATL). 
21 The New Zealand Parliamentary advises “that many sessions 
during the war were not reported, neither in Hansard nor in 
any newspaper, for security reasons”. Email communication 
7 February 2013.
22 Beaton’s biography of Greek poet and diplomat George Se fe-
ris calls the vent the “big flap”. Seferis witnessed the burning. 
Ro derick Beaton, George Seferis: Waiting for the Angel: a 
Bio gra phy, (New Haven: Yale university Press, 2003).
Archives and Army History Directorate of the Hellenic 
General staff, constraints of time and language did not 
offer any material to greatly alter the perspective pro-
vided by the New Zealand and British depositories. 
Several Greek-language secondary sources were used. 
In respect of these, I would like to thank Dr. Anna Ef-
sta thiadou-Adams, modern Greek language tutor and 
recent PhD graduate at the University of Queensland.
1942–1943 in the Middle East and Occupied Greece
In February 1942, eight months after the surrender on 
Crete, a New Zealand radio broadcast told of the role its 
soldiers had with the free Greek army now stationed in 
Palestine.23 This was the New Zealand Training Team 
(NZTT), which formed part of the British Military 
Mission attached to the Greek Army. As described, 
the new chain of command and structure showed that 
the New Zealanders now had a less formal and less 
prominent part vis a vis the Greeks than what they had 
on Crete, where training/liaison teams had joined the 
Greek regiments, and the whole island’s defence was 
under Freyberg. The 30-minute broadcast incorporat-
ed a range of elements – messages from some of the 
New Zealanders (according to the senior officer, Major 
Samson, there were apparently 60-70 personnel on at-
tachment altogether), background information from the 
British commander of the parent British Liaison Unit 
(or 210BLU), singing Greek soldiers and a message to 
New Zealand Greeks from the commander of the First 
Greek Brigade, which was receiving the training. 
The historical development of the then current train-
ing is linked to the earlier Crete situation, with the names 
given of the officers then attached to the Greek Army 
and also those who died there. Following the evacuation 
from the island, subsequent liaison work was carried 
out by New Zealanders, and Freyberg recently (3 weeks 
beforehand) expanded the contingent to its new level by 
adding three officers and 20 other ranks.24 
If the numbers mentioned by Samson and the date 
of the Broadcast are correct, then the escalation of per-
sonnel may be a preliminary indication of the British-
inspired Anglo-Greek Military Agreement, signed on 9 
March 1942. The New Zealanders were now involved 
in revitalising an ailing Greek Army (Royal Hellenic 
Army of the Middle East or VESMA).
At this dark stage of the war, forming the Greek per-
sonnel into a fighting force suffered from half-hearted-
ness by both British and Greek senior generals and a 
geographically, and psychologically, distant monarch in 
23 NZ Troops with the Greek Army 1942, Radio New Zealand 
Sound Archives, Christchurch, UCDR 312/2; UCDR341-1. 
Four months after previously mentioned radio broadcast a 
despatch from the official New Zealand war correspondent 
in the Middle East published in a provincial New Zealand 
newspaper, offered a darker picture of the training then being 
delivered to the Greeks. The lack of a common language was 
a major issue: “It takes time and unlimited patience to give a 
lecture”. When verbal instructions are replaced by the printed 
variety, “ludicrous complications” arise. Part of the latter 
problem was the multiple languages used by the Greeks (many 
of the new recruits came from the various Greek communities 
in the Middle East). “Training Schools”, Ellesmere Guardian, 
2 June 1942.
24 NZ Troops with the Greek Army 1942.
After Crete 195
exile and émigré Greek government.25 Ongoing political 
divisions between republicans, royalists and Metaxists, 
with extensive cronyism in the officer corps, all contrib-
uted toward malaise.26
New Zealand Enthusiasm and Awareness of Deeper 
Divisions 
While he was not officially privy to the deliberations 
between the senior British military, Foreign Office ap-
paratus and Greek decision makers about regeneration 
of Greek military forces (and exiting of senior Greek 
commanders), Freyberg had some idea of the wider po-
litical kinetics. Although not on the distribution list for 
a 29 January 1942 communication from Auchinleck, 
in charge of Middle East Forces, to the War Office in 
London, he had his own copy with the handwritten an-
notation “For General Bernard Freyberg (For Personal 
Use only)”.27 Changes to the senior levels of the Greek 
military in the Middle East were “recommended by me 
[Auchinleck] in the interests of military efficiency but 
there are also political and security reasons”.28 These 
he communicated separately to London. The opening 
paragraph of the communication suggests one of the 
contributing factors – “dissension in and unfitness for 
war of Greek forces”.29 
Incompetence of some senior officers was also inter-
laced with competing ideologically driven officer fac-
tions within the Greek forces. It was a shadowy interplay 
involving the monarch, his government, their British 
sponsors and the officer corps. One of Auchinleck’s fol-
low-on communications, and one Freyberg never saw, 
provided “personality notes” of individual senior Greek 
officers in the Middle East. It contained assessments 
such as “Royalist”, “neutral politic”, “Venizelist”, “pro 
Bri tish”. The Greek officer Freyberg would have the 
most to do with, the soon-to-be appointed Pafsanios 
Katso tas, was thought to be “independent politically”.30 
This British practice of categorising the Greek military 
was never shared with the Dominion for the remainder 
of the war. 
Freyberg turned a blind eye to the political manoeu-
vrings stated in what he had been given surreptitiously. 
In Wellington, nothing was received about the politically 
permeated Greek officer corps via the Dominions Office.
Freyberg was very positive about the potential of 
the Greeks. He jotted in one of his own files: “Material 
good”31 and wrote to one of his senior officers on 6 
April 1942: “I am certain that from what everybody tells 
me the younger Greek officers and men are excellent 
material.”32 He was, however, sceptical of the abilities 
25 Spyropoulos, op. cit. The author provides the most com pre-
hensive study.
26 Fleischer, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
27 WAII 8 Part II T Freyberg Papers, Archives New Zealand 
(ANZ), The War Office copy can be found at in WO 193/48, 
The National Archives (TNA).
28 Ibidem.
29 Ibidem.
30 WO 32/17213 (TNA), 12 February 1942.
31 WAII 8 T Part II (ANZ).
32 WAII 8 T Part II Probably Freyberg to Stevens, 6 April 1942 
(ANZ).
of the senior Greek commanders. If they proved “not up 
to the mark”, then the Greek king and Greek command-
er in chief would be approached. He also stressed that: 
“It is most important, however, that the Greeks should 
not think we are reporting on their officers.” Freyberg 
was also confident that his new broom would do the 
job: “I had a further talk with the King [George II of 
the Hellene] and I am certain that the policy as outlined, 
if pushed with the energy I hope it will, will be much 
more successful than the one in operation before we 
came into the picture.”33
Considerable Investment 
The General may have been energised, but being with 
the Greeks had low priority in the reporting that he sent 
from the Middle East to the New Zealand capital. Only 
a single paragraph made that journey, and even that was 
part of a longer general update about the war situation:
“In our new defensive position we shall have a bri-
gade group of Greeks under command. These are men 
evacuated from Crete, as yet partially armed and not 
trained. After the evacuation from Greece we were 
asked by General Headquarters, Middle East, to train 
the Greeks. We have sent to the Royal Greek Army 
numbers of New Zealand officers and instructors to 
help them in the use of British weapons. Further, we 
have taken Greek officers and men into our training es-
tablishments at Maadi. Thus we have made our contri-
bution to the general pool of instruction in the Middle 
East. I knew it would have your approval. The Greek 
Government bore all necessary expenses. The Greek 
Brigade Group will come up to Syria to complete their 
collective training under our guidance and will then 
come under our operational command.”34
The training contribution from New Zealand was 
considerable. In addition to the previously mentioned 
NZTT, New Zealand’s School of Instruction was in-
volved. Its Internal history devotes an entire chapter to 
the Greek training, which began on 12 March 1942. Its 
prominence is not matched by other nations’ attendees. 
The courses included, but were not limited to, chemical 
warfare, weapons training, intelligence and transporta-
tion and maintenance.35 The issue of language led to 
the courses being doubled in length and training ma-
terial, standing orders etc. being translated. There was 
also an increase in the instructional staffing level at 
the School.36 When the training was completed on 30 
January 1943 (nearly 10 months after it started), 1,124 
students had attended some 68 courses. If one adds to 
this the 830 Greeks who were either processed forward 
to other New Zealand units for training, then the total 
is nearly 2,000. It is indicative of the nature of desert 
warfare that courses related to transport collectively 
comprised the major course attendances (377 at the 
school with another “280 placed with depots for driving 
33 Ibidem.
34 Telegram 134, 21 March 1942, Documents Relating to New 
Zealand’s Participation in the Second World War 1939–45: 
Volume II.
35 WAII DA 164/15/1 (ANZ), GP Scott, NZ School of Instruc-
tion – 2 NZEF Middle East Force.
36 Ibidem.
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instruction”).37 The NZTT stayed with the Greeks long-
er than the School provided training; keeping a small 
number with them until late 1943.38
It would seem it was the NZTT who experienced, 
or suffered, given the subsequent published tirade from 
one senior New Zealand commander, political agitation 
in the Greek army. In 1958, Bill Stevens, former Major 
General and responsible for all administration in the 
2NZEF (Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force)39, 
wrote: “Greeks are by nature politically minded to a de-
gree unheard of among British communities” and “The 
patience of the training team was strained almost to 
breaking point, for it was difficult to get any continuity, 
beginning with the Greek commander, who seemed to 
change every full moon.”40 Stevens may be exaggerating 
in his counting of commanders, but the NZTT was still 
in place when the Greek military experienced its first 
popular-based protest in early 1943. Unlike the preced-
ing machinations of officer corps factions, that were a 
factor in bringing about the Anglo Greek Agreement and 
increased New Zealand involvement in early 1942, the 
unrest in early 1943 was communicated to Wellington.
When Politics Became Obvious 
On 8 March 1943, albeit nearly a year after Freyberg 
informed Fraser abound him having the Greeks, Wel-
ling ton learnt that the political left in the Greek armed 
forces had made their first open challenge to the Greco-
British decision making in the Middle-East. The Do-
min ions Office cabled: “Serious political disturbances 
have broken out in two brigades of the Greek army 
stationed in Syria.”41 Although it mentioned mass res-
ignations of rightist officers, reporting on the actions 
and demands of the un-named and leftist semi-secret 
Anti-Fascist Military Organisation (ASO) comprised 
most of the communication. In this short communica-
tion, the New Zealand administration learnt about the 
“underground agitation” of the left against “reputedly 
Fascist Greek elements in authority”.42 Also that “sol-
diers committees” that were “consisting of N.C.O.s 
and junior officers” had usurped the military chain of 
command. The demands of the soldiers were primarily 
around pursuing the war effort more vigorously. To that 
end, they wanted a new government formed, removal of 
officers who displayed lack of interest in fighting and 
”expressed themselves in favour of dictatorship or said 
that German discipline was best for the Greek Army.”43
37 Ibidem.
38 HQ 2NZDIV from GHQ ME, 6 Nov. 1942, WO 201/134 
(TNA), W.G. Stevens, Problems of 2 NZEF, (Wellington: 
Historical Publications Branch, 1958).
39 Essentially the New Zealanders had a fighting arm, the 
Second New Zealand Division 2NZDIV and a large training 
and administration component 2NZEF. While the former 
was deployed in North Africa, Middle East and Italy, NZEF 
had as its main infrastructure at the Maadi Camp on the 
outskirts of Cairo.
40 Stevens, Problems of 2NZEF, pp. 134-35.
41 Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Prime Minister 
Wellington, 8 March 1943, AAEG 950 132e 345/4/1 1b 
(ANZ). Hereafter the Secretary is referred to as SECDOM.
42 Ibidem.
43 Ibidem.
Changes demanded by the recalcitrant soldiers were 
implemented, but the core of Anglo-Greek policy re-
mained unchanged. A revamped government was one 
thing, but on 26 March, Wellington was told that London 
provided “Full support to the King and present Greek 
Government“ and “maintenance and strengthening of 
the King’s personal authority [with] the Greek armed 
forces”.44 In addition to these points, the telegram also 
stated – “Approval of recent declarations by the King 
and Prime Minister to the effect that the Government are 
not exercising dictatorial authority and intend to leave 
it to Greek people to determine their future political 
conditions” and there was “Encouragement to efforts to 
broaden the basis of the present Government”.45 Britain 
was still committed to the cornerstone of its Greek poli-
cy – support for King George II, an Anglophile. He was 
also a monarch who had allowed the dictator Metaxas to 
assume dictatorial power before the war. 
As Freyberg had done to him the previous year, Fra-
ser refrained from communicating anything about the 
situation in the Greek forces to his General. In a way, 
the lack of coordinated effort and communication in the 
leadership that was evident in the 1941 misadventures 
seemed to be repeating itself .The degree of risk and con-
sequences were greatly different. But the two leaders had 
not discussed anything about the Greeks. This was true 
not only as concerns the political dynamics in the Greek 
army but also anything about the proposed joint force. 
Partly, this lack of communication may be explained by 
the rapidly changing conditions of 1942. In June, Frey-
berg and his Division urgently moved from Sy ria when 
Rom mel made his thrust into Egypt.46 They left just as 
the bulk of Greeks arrived for the joint exercises that 
Fraser had been informed about a few months before. 
Only a small group of Greek officers had preceded them 
and spent over a week observing the New Zea land 6 Bri-
gade conduct its own exercises.47 They would also be 
involved with the Dominion’s forces in constructing de-
fensive fortifications for a possible Ger man advance if 
the Wehrmacht broke through at Sta lin grad. 48 It was a 
crisis, and given British views on Greeks serving with 
New Zealanders, described later, it is not sur prising that 
the matter of the Greeks was not pursued. Fra ser was also 
faced with the Japanese drive into the Pacific.
44 AAEG 950 132e 345/4/1 1b (ANZ) Greece political affairs 
1940-1943, SECDOM to Prime Minister Wellington, 25 
March 1943.
45 Ibidem.
46 For a concise description of the urgent move see J.L 
Scoullar, Battle for Egypt: the summer of 1942, (Wellington: 
War History Branch, 1955].
47 Katsotas to Freyberg, 1 June 1942, WAII 8 Part II Royal 
Greek Army (ANZ).
48 Besides the exercises, the Greeks just as the New Zealand-
ers had been doing for months beforehand, were involved 
in building fortifications for “The plan of defence of Syria 
and Palestine from the North and North-East involves the 
preparation of tank proof fortresses sited to deny the enemy 
the use of all main arteries of communications in southern 
Syria, Palestine and Transjordan.” The specific Greek/New 
Zealand fortress was Djedeide. New Zealand Divisional In-
struction No. 8, 3 June 1942. Headquarters 4 New Zealand 
Infantry Brigade – War Diary, 1 May-31 May 1942, WAII 
1 1639 DA 46/1/29 Pt 2 (ANZ). Despite the title of this file, 
the June instruction can be found there.
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New Zealand Ambivalence 
Following the crisis of June, Freyberg’s force had only 
brief encounters with the Greeks who had been sent 
to the El Alamein front, thanks to the efforts of Greek 
Minister Panayotis Kanellopoulos. Following that, ex-
cept for the small NZTT, the link was virtually severed. 
The 2NZDIV pursued Rommel westwards, and the 
Greeks returned to their camps. 
The separation was not welcomed by the Greek Bri-
gade commander, Katsotas. Before the March 1943 
events and aftermath led to his dismissal, he continually 
sought to join the New Zealanders in the fight.49 The 
response was polite, but unhelpful. In contrast to his 
earlier enthusiasm, Freyberg’s behaviour shifted to am-
bivalence. When the Greek told the General he needed 
transport for his troops so as to join the 2NZDIV at El 
Ala mein, Freyberg directed his staff to provide a polite 
response but made no commitment. Deception was ap-
plied: “you can depend on me to do all I can do”.50 On 
the Katsotas note he wrote “No Further Action”51. This 
was in contrast to his own semi-private notes, where ear-
lier he showed a genuine appreciation of the equipment 
issue and sought to remedy it.52 Besides this, he still had 
an interest in the wellbeing of the Greeks. When he fleet-
ingly encountered the newly arrived Greek Brigade, for 
example, after the first battle of El Alamein, he told one 
of his senior commanders “I am glad we were there just 
long enough to see the latter go in.”53 He also appreci-
ated the Greeks who came to visit him when he was 
recuperating from a serious wound received in Egypt: 
“I have quite a stream of visitors including a large quota 
from the Royal Greek Army who are most attentive and 
bring me great bouquets of flowers.”54 
While the direct communication between the Greeks 
and New Zealanders over a planned joint force ended 
with Freyberg’s reluctance in September, by December 
they were appearing together in British dictated opera-
tions. In December the 2NZDIV was told by British 
command that the former would supply officers and 
“organize…moves” by the Greek Brigade as part of 
Operation Guillotine.55 This plan never coalesced into 
anything real.
Besides this officially dictated, but never implement-
ed, operation, Freyberg’s diary shows fleeting encoun-
ters between the New Zealanders and Greeks during 
the months following the exit from Syria in June.56 The 
49 The first was in June, the last in September Katsotas to 
Headquarters New Zealand Division 15 June 1942, WAII 
8/19 PPP Part 2 (ANZ); Katsotas to Freyberg, 17 Septem ber, 
1942 WAII 8 T Part II (ANZ).
50 Freyberg to Katsotas, 21 September 1942, WAII 8 T Part II 
(ANZ).
51 Notation on Katsotas letter by Freyberg.
52 WAII 8/13 V.
53 WAII 8/13 V Freyberg to Inglis, 14 September 1942 (ANZ).
54 Copy of letter from Freyberg to unknown recipient, 11 July 
1942, WAII 8 PPP part 3 (ANZ).
55 Guillotine Notes No 1 Main HQ 30 Corps, 2 Dec. 1942, HQ 
2NZDIV General Staff War Diary 1-30 December 1942, 
WAII 1 1633 DA 21.1/1/36 (ANZ).
56 8 September Katsotas and “a group of Greek officers arrived”. 
The following day Freyberg visited the Greek Bri gade and 
also saw Prince Peter, who stayed with the New Zea land ers 
entry for 2 December is telling of the current attitude: 
“Brigadier Katsotas (Gk Bde) called – he is delighted 
to be with us again (but not for long!).57 Two days later 
the Greek commander said goodbye. Although it is not 
recorded, the Greek regular army were leaving an op-
era tional role in the campaign.
The reason for Freyberg’s contradictory behaviour 
and change in attitude lies not in the emergence of the 
politicised ASO (despite Stevens’ later outburst, there is 
no evidence of any discussion within the New Zealand 
senior command about any political problem and, as 
discussed earlier, there was Fraser’s silence). It was re-
ally with the British. Freyberg’s desire for a joint force 
was his alone. On 13 May, less than two months after 
he sent his one and only telegram to Fraser, the Greek 
King George II was told as much, during an inspection 
the Greek troops on 13 May: “The C-in-C [Auchinleck] 
made it clear that he had no intention of incorporating 
the Greek troops in the N.Z. Division to whom they 
had been affiliated for training purpose only, and the 
Greek Brigade Group was formed as a self-contained 
Independent Group in order that they could retain its 
identity.”58 The British intention for non-integration of 
the New Zealand and Greek forces is further demon-
strated by a directive given Freyberg, nearly a month 
after the Wellington telegram. On 15 April, the British 
Middle East Forces High command told him that they 
intended an Indian brigade, rather than the Greeks, to 
join any prospective Turkish venture should entering 
that country be necessitated by a German breakthrough 
at Stalingrad.59 
Freyberg simply did not hold the authority to help the 
Greeks. The Dominion’s military leader, with the seem-
ing acquiescence of the Prime Minister, had an interest in 
fighting alongside the Greeks, but could not in fluence ul-
timate British authority. New Zealand was going down a 
path characterised by non-recognition of the vicissitudes 
of the forces within the Greek camp and how Britain 
would respond to them. It had not brought disaster, but in 
the ensuing years, the risks were escalating as New Zea-
land ers found themselves in precarious situations that 
were, to an extent, ignored by their own leaders and also 
caused them to pursue outcomes the New Zealand lead-
ership was trying to avoid. The first involved clandestine 
British operations in occupied Greece.
Special Operations Executive
Not only was 1942 the time when the idea of an af-
filiated Greco-New Zealand force was pursued by 
Frey berg, it was also the year when individual New 
Zea lan ders serving with the Second New Zealand Ex-
pe ditionary Force (2NZEF) entered into another type 
of wartime relationship with Greece. Two sapper of-
ficers, Tom Barnes and Arthur Edmonds, were placed 
on special service with Special Operations Executive 
overnight. He observed the Greeks, who had arrived in an 
unorganised state at the front had “been located and brought 
in out of the dust”. GOC Diary WAII 8 44 & 45 (ANZ).
57 Ibidem.
58 Report No 3 on the Royal Greek Army in the Middle East 
for the month of May 1942. K51 Tsouderos Papers General 
State Archives (GAK), Athens.
59 WAII 8 Box 3 23 MidEast to NZ Division, 15 April 1942.
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(SOE). They were part of Operation Harling that blew 
up the Gorgopotamos Viaduct in November of that year. 
Staying on in Occupied Greece, they rose to senior po-
sitions with the British Military Mission (BMM) there. 
It was a precarious existence, with the need to balance 
military activity against the Anglo-Greek political land-
scape. As shown later, for one of their fellow country-
men, it would prove fatal.
Other New Zealanders followed these two. Esti-
mates are uncertain: “At least ten New Zealanders 
served for periods with the military mission in Greece 
between 1942 and the end of the German occupation 
in late 1944”.60 This is against a total of 383 allied liai-
son officers quoted in a study on the wartime Greek re-
sistance.61 However, by holding senior positions in the 
BMM and through individual officers’ actions, they had 
an involvement in both military and political matters 
greater than their small numbers suggested. Barnes and 
Edmonds were attached to EDES and ELAS head quar-
ters respectively. Right-wing EDES (Ethni kos Di mo-
kra tikos Ellinikos Syndesmos or Natio nal Repub lican 
Greek League) became pro-royalist after a change in 
allegiance, and so received British endorsement and 
material support. It was headed by Na po lean Zer vas. 
Left-wing ELAS (Ellinikós Laïkós Ape lef the ro ti kós 
Stra tós, or Greek People’s Liberation Army) was the 
military arm of a united front of leftist parties, EAM 
(Natio nal Liberation Front or Ethniko Ape lef the ro tiko 
Me to po). EAM/ELAS was a major threat to strategic 
British interests, but the immediate military exigencies 
of defeating the Axis led to them being tolerated for the 
duration of the occupation. New Zealanders were now 
operating with opposing forces in what was essentially 
developing into a civil war, with the added complexity 
of British involvement.
While Barnes and Edmonds were operating at sen-
ior levels, their fellow countrymen were carrying out 
sabotage operations. All were involved in the political 
dimension. Don Stott was to become the most contro-
versial. In an episode not communicated to Wellington 
at the time, Stott met with quislings and Nazi represent-
atives in Athens. This was possibly to discuss a separate 
peace over Greece between Britain and the Germans 
but, according to Stott, his intention was to gather intel-
ligence. The episode has attracted considerable atten-
tion in the literature.62 At the time, it was discussed by 
British, American and Greek parties. Tsouderos, still 
Greek premier, showed the US Ambassador to his gov-
ernment one of Stott’s reports.63 The American intelli-
60 Ian McGibbon, New Zealand and the Second World War: 
People, Battles and Legacy, (Auckland: Hodder Moa Beckett, 
2004), p. 116.
61 John Louis Hondros, Occupation and Resistance: Greek 
Agony 1941-44, (New York: Pella, 1983), p. 228.
62 Clogg offers the latest treatment. Richard Clogg, “Negotia-
tions of a Complicated Character: Don Stott’s ‘adventures’ in 
Athens October – November 1943”, in: Mark Seaman (ed.), 
Spe cial Operations Executive: a New Instrument of War, 
(Lon don: Routledge, 2006), pp. 148-156. See also “Don 
Stott Affair: Overtures for an Anglo-German Local Peace 
in Gree ce”, in: M. Sarafis (ed.), Greece: From Resistance to 
Civil War, (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1980), pp. 91-107.
63 John O. Latrides, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece 
1933-1947, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 
gence service, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), let 
it be known to Salas, the head of the left-wing Greek 
army mutineers who had earlier staged their first revolt 
in the desert.64 
New Zealand authorities were unaware of such de-
tailed events. Personnel from 2NZEF were on “special 
service”, as their New Zealand army records and the 
sparse post-war official history described them.65 They 
were seemingly in a secret black box, with only brief 
and infrequent contact confined to administrative mat-
ters, and away from their home army. Despite this, New 
Zealand leadership twice had the opportunity to involve 
itself in their fate. The first was coincidental, driven by 
other events, and came to nothing.
Selectivity in Recalling New Zealanders 
Responding to a November 1943 request from SOE to 
promote Bob Morton (again with no details), Don Stott’s 
companion during the controversial Athens events, Frey-
berg told his own staff that he would not because “We 
are withdrawing all our detached personnel”. He added 
a somewhat intriguing provision: “Morton should be re-
called unless he is essential from our point of view”.66 
Nearly four weeks later, he had actually decided that 
Mor ton should be recalled.67 In fact, Morton did not re-
turn to the New Zealanders. Having worked with Don 
Stott in Athens, he and Stott went on to the Far East with 
SOE. Stott disappeared there, presumably drowned. 
The return of the New Zealand personnel that Frey-
berg alluded to had nothing to do with SOE. This 
was the New Zealand response to the fate of the New 
Zealand Squadron of the Long Range Desert Group 
(LRDG). Fraser, his emotions enflamed by the initial 
reports that the force of New Zealanders had been an-
nihilated in the failed Aegean campaign of late 194368, 
pursued the issue over several months. The crux of the 
matter was that New Zealand troops had been used in 
a new theatre of war without the agreement of the New 
Zealand government. His efforts involved Freyberg, the 
senior British military commander, Dominions Office 
and the New Zealand High Commissioner in London. 
The official war history shows that no less than nine-
teen telegrams were sent between the parties during the 
time. The final outcome was Fraser’s insistence that the 
New Zealander contingent return to the 2NZEF.69 The 
episode was still scathingly referred to by Fraser at the 
Prime Minister’s conference in the following year.70
Freyberg was initially unaware of the involvement 
of the New Zealand contingent. When he found out, he 
alerted Wellington and attributed the lack of consulta-
pp. 430-31.
64 Fleischer, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
65 McGlynn, op. cit.
66 Freyberg to i/c Adm., 10 November, 1943. WAII 8 II Frey-
berg Papers 2 NZEF Misc 1943 (ANZ).
67 Ibidem.
68 Anthony Rogers, Churchill’s Folly: Leros and the Aegean, 
(London: Cassell, 2003).
69 Documents Relating to New Zealand’s Participation in the 
Second World War 1939-45: Volume II, Telegrams 339 to 
357. 
70 F.L.W. Wood, op. cit., p. 284.
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tion to a misunderstanding from an earlier agreement 
with the British.71 Taking the thrust of this study, the 
Aegean fiasco was similar to the campaigns of 1941 and 
the VESMA episode in North Africa/Middle East and 
SOE in Greece. It held a familiar behaviour pattern by 
the New Zealand leadership – one of unco-ordination. 
On the other hand, Fraser had acted over the LRDG, 
unlike VESMA and SOE in Greece. In some ways it 
was restricted thinking. The political dimension was 
not transmitted to the New Zealand leadership. This in-
volved the threatened resignation of Tsouderos and dis-
missal of local ELAS.72 The New Zealand LRDG prob-
ably had no exposure to this. It had been assigned an 
island distant from these happenings. That could not be 
said of the New Zealanders with SOE. An event involv-
ing one of the officers was reported to Wellington dur-
ing the same time as Wellington and Freyberg were pur-
suing the LRDG issue with the British. The Dominion 
response was in stark contrast to the Aegean debacle.
Death of Arthur Hubbard
The second incident involved Lieutenant Arthur Hub-
bard. On 18 October 1943, the Commonwealth Do-
min ions were informed by London of a New Zealand 
officer’s death in occupied Greece. He had been killed 
by ELAS, the left-wing partisan movement. British 
authorities were sending an “ultimatum to ELAS com-
man der, Colonel Sarafis, demanding immediate execu-
tion of those guilty of [the] murder of [the] Liaison offi-
cer.”73 Although Hubbard was again not named, another 
com munication sent directly to only Wellington, one 
day later, again made it clear it was a New Zealand of-
ficer who had died.74 The incident took place during the 
fighting between EDES and ELAS often called the first 
round of the Greek Civil War. The outcome of a Bri tish-
Greek investigation was a finding of accidental death.75 
Neither in the a existing publication storehouse nor 
in the New Zealand primary sources is there any evi-
dence that Wellington, Freyberg or even the post-war 
New Zea land military76 showed any interest in Hub-
71 Documents Relating to New Zealand’s participation in the 
Second World War 1939-45: Volume II, Cable 339 Freyberg 
to Minister of Defence, 19 September 1943.
72 Philip John Carabott, “British Military Occupation, under 
a British Military Governor, but without a British military 
Administration: the case of Samos, 8 September to 18 
November 1943”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol 7 
(2), (1989), pp. 287-319. 
73 SECDOM to governments of Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and South Africa, 18 October 1943. DO 35/1545 
(PRO).
74 SECDOM Office to Peter Fraser, 19 October 1943. AAEG 
950 177a 345/4/8 Pt 1 1943-46. (ANZ).
75 PREM 3/211/8 (TNA) Anthony Eden made the point to 
Churchill. The latter had used the word “murder” in the 
House of Commons.
76 A memorandum from New Zealand Military Headquarters, 
Lon don (essentially a liaison posting) nearly a year after the 
death speaks of the British “War Office have requested that no 
pub licity be given the matter.” Even the manner of his death 
should only be communicated to his mother “as a matter of 
stric test secrecy.”, Memorandum 1 Sept. 1944 from DAAG, 
HQ 2 NZEF to Army Headquarters, Wel ling ton, 1 Septem-
ber 1944. Lieutenant Wilfred Arthur Hub bard PF 20475, New 
Zea land Defence Force Personnel Archives, Trentham.
bard’s death or the subsequent investigation. This was 
in contrast to the reactions of the British SOE77 political 
lead er ship78 or, as discussed later, his fellow SOE New 
Zea land er, Bill Jordan.
1943 then closed with New Zealanders serving in 
Occupied Greece with SOE and its army fighting in 
Italy. Anger came with the failed Aegean venture, si-
lence over the death of a New Zealand operative. The 
New Year would see a degree of change in the Dominion 
leadership over its attitude toward its military serving in 
Greek matters. 
1944 – Year of Liberation
The year of Greek liberation began with Bernard Frey-
berg maintaining his enthusiasm for the Greek mili-
tary. From 27 January to 20 February, Prince Peter of 
the Hellenes, and senior Greek liaison officer to the 
British army intermittently visited and stayed with the 
2NZEF, now embroiled in the fight for Cassino in Italy. 
Freyberg’s semi-official diary noted that he was there 
on “attachment” and how, on the day the Prince left, he 
“seemed to have enjoyed his visit”. The diary entry con-
tinued: “He wants to bring over the Greek Brigade” and 
was off to talk about it to General Maitland Wilson.79
This brief entry belies the extent of the senior New 
Zealander’s interest in helping the Prince’s cause. The 
official Greek record (one and a half pages long) reveals 
a much more extensive discussion than Freyberg’s di-
ary suggests. According to the Prince, on 2 February, 
Freyberg raised the notion that the Greek Brigade join 
the New Zealanders “as he was informed, the brigade 
was about to be deployed to the Italian front”. The 
Prince then visited Filed Marshall Harold Alexander, 
who, hearing of Freyberg’s offer, said “he was very 
pleased from the request of Major General Freyberg, 
which he completely approved, adding that this would 
facilitate greatly the proper use of the Greek forces”. 
Freyberg was then informed of the successful visit. It 
would seem that, to give the proposition the best chance 
of success, Freyberg then asked the Greek Prince to raise 
it with Field Marshall Wilson, Supreme Commander 
Mediterranean. The Prince did just that, six days af-
ter leaving Freyberg’s command. Like Alexander, 
Wilson was supportive. Apparently, the prince’s argu-
ments about the strong bond between Greece and New 
Zealand helped to overturn a plan to place the Greeks 
with the Free French forces and keep them far from 
the front. Freyberg had planned that the Greeks would 
join the New Zealand brigade commanded by Brigadier 
Howard Kippenberger (spelt as “Kippenbeyer” in the 
Greek document).80 
77 See for example, Cables in HS 5/223, HS 5/224; HS 9/755/6 
(TNA).
78 Churchill raised the death in the House of Commons. Eden 
cautioned him on the accuracy of what he said, pointing to 
the outcome of the official joint enquiry. PREM 3/211/8 
(TNA).
79 WAII 8 46 Part IV GOC Diary (ANZ).
80 Emmanouel I Tsouderos, Historiko Archeio 1941-1944, 
vol. 4, (Athena: Phytrakēs, 1990), p. 1130-1131. Kip pen ber-
ger, who would eventually be the general editor of the huge 
official war history project and President of the New Zea-
land Returned Services Association (RSA).
MArtyn Brown200
Freyberg’s offer seemed to have overcome the Bri-
tish general’s initial reluctance to have the Greeks in 
Ita ly. The British had even considered sending the 
Greeks to Britain.81 In the issue of having the Greeks in 
Italy, he was in conflict with Churchill’s persistent drive 
to have them there.82 
It would be another six months before the intended 
joint Dominion-Greek force finally eventuated. In be-
tween, there had been some critical developments in 
the Greek armed forces as regarded Anglo-Greek rela-
tions. These would finally generate some conscious and 
shared communication amongst the Zealand leadership 
about Greek matters and where they stood in them. It 
was, however, not a policy that was comprehensive, nor 
one attracting fidelity. 
May-July 1944 – New Zealand takes a Stance but 
does not Pursue a Cohesive Policy
By February 1944, internecine fighting between the 
partisans had largely dissipated with the signing of the 
Plaka Agreement. Another explosive event would oc-
cur in April, with the widespread mutiny in the Greek 
armed forces. It spread throughout the Mediterranean83 
to as far as Britain.84
The New Zealand administration received a stream 
of telegrams from London about the convulsions that 
engulfed the Greek émigré government and Greek 
armed forces during this period as well as the mutinous 
Greek armed forces itself.85 Greek premier Emmanuel 
Tsouderos fell first and was quickly followed by 
Sofoklis Venizelos. Fraser was also privy to some of 
the British intrigue in stabilizing the Greek émigré gov-
ernment by protecting the latest Greek Prime minister, 
George Papandreou, over the arrests of public figures 
during the aftermath. The New Zealand Prime Minister 
was told “arrests were carried out with the knowledge 
of Papandreou but this fact is not to be disclosed as it is 
most undesirable that the latter should be associated in 
any way with the arrests.”86
The decision to use force if necessary to quell the 
mutiny was communicated to Wellington on 14 April.87 
The mutineers were defeated, and the question of pun-
ishment arose. It was over this that Prime Minister Peter 
Fraser would break the largely one-way telegraphic 
traffic from London in July to state “a personal opin-
ion” that clemency should be given to the mutineers 
81 WO 201/1767 Scobie to Chief Liaison Officer, 15 October 
1943 (TNA).
82 See for example, Churchill to Eisenhower and Wilson, 
repeated Alexander, 29 December 1943. His reasoning was 
premised “on political grounds”. WO 214/44 (TNA).
83 Spyropoulos, op. cit.
84 David Syrett, op. cit.; Jones, op. cit.
85 AAEG 950 140g 345/4/1/pt. 2, Political Affairs Greece 
1944-1945; See also the originating agency to ensure a more 
confident store of data DO35/1547 (TNA) Correspondence 
with Dominion Governments, including correspondence 
between Field Marshal Smuts, Prime Minister of South 
Africa, and Mr Winston Churchill, on formation of new 
Greek government.
86 AAEG 950 140 g 345/4/1 pt 2 (ANZ) SECDOM to Minister 
of External Affairs Wellington, 17 May 1944.
87 SECDOM to Minister of External Affairs, 14 April, 1944.
sentenced to death. Even though he did not say he was 
expressing a formal government view, he had not been 
asked to offer any opinion. He formed his view after 
meeting with Papandreou and “other leaders” during his 
trip to London (including some time in Cairo) for the 
Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference held in 
early May.88 According to the New Zealand press, these 
unnamed personalities were the Greek King and Prince 
Peter. Fraser had met them and Papandreou in the Egyp-
tian capital.89 On the same trip, he visited Freyberg and 
the troops in Italy. The cablegram contained a message 
within a message. Non-recognition in the communica-
tion was a symptom that the Greek royal family was 
anathema to Fraser. That would be illustrated in a De-
cem ber cablegram. That, as shown later, would be 
amidst a public and highly controversial backdrop.
The sympathetic stance on the mutineers in the July 
communication was in contrast to Churchill and Pa-
pan dreou, who wanted the ringleaders executed. It was 
not a blatant protest at British policy, but it was more 
specific than the New Zealand Prime Minister’s earlier 
outburst at the Prime Ministers Conference in London 
during May. There, as the minutes record, he made a 
broad-ranging cynical statement. It was in the context 
of geopolitics and the location of the second front. Jan 
Smuts, Premier of South Africa, wanted more atten-
tion to the Balkans and raised the spectre of Russian 
occupation there. Fraser, after arguing for the priority 
of Overlord, saw: “the Balkans as a seething mass of 
factions, who would turn to whoever would give them 
the most support or hold out to them most hope for the 
future.”90 Just who exactly he meant (émigré govern-
ments, monarchs or resistance groups) is not clear. 
What is evident is that Fraser did not understand how 
to mesh the military and strategic political together. 
During the same meeting, he said “that political mat-
ters should not be brought in to the discussion of the 
military courses of action… Military policy could be 
in no way subordinated to political considerations.”91 
In this, he was showing a naivety, not even learn-
ing from the geopolitical dimension of the Operation 
Lustre in 1941 (i.e. British hopes of creating a Balkan 
front composed of Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey), 
but also as to the place of Greece in a British post-war 
world. Still, something had been said to the British, and 
as later events were to show, the meeting in Italy with 
Freyberg had apparently included further discussions 
about Greek politics.
Occupied Greece
Inside occupied Greece, Fraser’s soldiers were carrying 
out actions or making recommendations that conflicted 
with their Prime Minister’s newly emerged line. Less 
than two weeks before the London session where Fraser 
argued against resources going into Balkan adventures, 
Bill Jordan, still serving with SOE, foretold the intro-
88 AAEG 950 140 g 345/4/1 pt 2 (ANZ) Political Affairs 
Greece 1944 – 1945, Fraser to SECDOM, 22 July 1944.
89 “Visit to Rome”, Evening Post, 10 June 1944.
90 PMM (44) 4th meeting, 3 May 1944, 4, EA 1 153/20/6, 
pt.1, ANZ. The Wood study quotes the same.
91 Ibidem.
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duction of allied special forces troops during the months 
immediately before liberation and Churchill’s own de-
mand of his generals for speed of entry into Greece i.e. 
his MANNA plan to prevent EAM/ELAS from assum-
ing dominance in post-liberated Greece. Jordan wrote 
in his official tour of duty report: “If Greece has any 
post-war importance for us, and I suspect it has, it is es-
sential Allied troops be employed in sufficient numbers 
… It is better to bring in troops before the liberation 
then to bring them in afterwards.”92 By “us”, he could 
not mean New Zealand but Britain.
His colleague, Tom Barnes, was also in a situation 
directly in conflict with Fraser’s predilection about the 
mutineers. Nine days after the Prime Minister’s mes-
sage seeking clemency, Barnes was directed to report 
on the effect of the possible execution of mutineers 
on steer ing the left resistance towards adherence to 
British lines. The veiled threat, it was stated in the wire-
less communi ca tion, had come from Anthony Eden in 
a House of Com mons speech and was in the context 
of forming a pliant new national government under 
Papandreou: “hinting broad ly if unity can thereby be 
achieved concessions could be made to EAM in matter 
of execution of mutineers”.93 
That a disjuncture was developing between the New 
Zea land leadership and demands placed on members 
of its military serving in Greece is apparent. Pressure 
placed upon SOE British Liaison Officers (BLOs) in 
1944 was also becoming more acute as the political 
stakes increased with the looming liberation. While 
Fra ser had met Papandreou, who had wanted the death 
penal ty, and disassociated himself from the Greek’s 
line of action, the BLOs serving in Greece had been 
ordered to promote the same Papandreou government. 
This, as one SOE memorandum stated, had caused “bad 
blood” between ELAS and the BLOs.94 Against this 
was a broader consideration in higher policy circles at 
“violent” denunciation of EAM and withdrawal of the 
BLOs from EAM/ELAS-controlled areas.95 The possi-
ble consequences to the safety of those liaison officers 
could be disastrous. Anger at Hub bard’s death from the 
previous year also still lingered. On 1 June, Bill Jordan, 
who was with him when he died and whose report on 
the incident reached senior levels of the British estab-
lish ment, basically repudiated the findings of the court 
of inquiry and stated: “I do not feel disposed to let the 
matter rest”.96 He continued with his intention after the 
war, producing at least one booklet in 194697, a feature 
news paper story on the 20th anniversary of the killing98 
and a monograph in 1969.99 
92 NZ Officer Major Jordan Report on Tour of Duty in Greece, 
22 April 1944, HS9/812/3, (TNA).
93 Force 133 to London, 31 July 1944, HS 5/224, (TNA).
94 Memorandum, 14 June 1944, HS 5/224, TNA.
95 Memorandum, 21 July 1944, HS 5/224, (TNA).
96 Comment on Evidence and Findings of Mixed Court of 
Enquiry into Shooting of Lieut. W.A. Hubbard, 2NZEF by 
ELAS Andartes on 13 Oct. 43, HS 9/755/6, (TNA).
97 Bill Jordan, Truth about Greece, (Melbourne: Araluen, 1946).
98 Bill Jordan, “Story of the Death of Wilfred A. Hubbard at 
the Hands of Greek Communists 12 October 1943”, New 
Zealand Herald, 12 October 1963. 
99 Bill Jordan, Conquest Without Victory.
Hubbard still resonated with other BLOs as well. 
Nicholas Hammond, a senior member of SOE in Greece, 
wrote to Edmonds in June referring to “malicious propa-
ganda such as EAM used at the time of Hubbard’s death 
which was attributed to drunkenness.”100 This last quote 
comes from a report over 6 months after Wellington 
first heard about Hubbard. Wellington had, and would, 
remain quiet. Incongruously, the Prime Minister would 
shortly make his confidential statement about the sen-
tenced mutineers. This reinforces the glaring lack of in-
terest in the New Zealand SOE personnel during the oc-
cupation – both in their safety and in what they were do-
ing in terms of British policy toward Greece. This even 
held true for those who had left Greece and returned 
home. Don Stott, who met with collaborators and Nazi 
representatives in Athens, returned to New Zealand at 
the beginning of May 1944 and left on 19 July. There 
was apparently no process or policy to debrief him. This 
may have been because he was still a member of SOE 
and would shortly leave for Far East operations, where 
he would disappear, presumed drowned, in a seaborne 
sabotage mission. Time was spent on clarifying admin-
istrative issues with the local army bodies. Freyberg’s 
military secretary sent the barest of information (basi-
cally dates of major movements such as secondment 
and promotion) to Army Headquarters in Wellington 
about Stott’s history in Middle East.101 It could do little 
more, as the officer was within the realms of British. In 
contrast, events in the latter half of the year would show 
a willingness of New Zealand to discuss and act when it 
came to dangers that its army might face. These would 
be in the Italian theatre and shortly later, over the ques-
tion of returning to free mainland Greece.
Italy – New Zealand and Greek Military
The New Zealand and Greek armies finally went into 
battle as an affiliated formation during September 1944 
in Italy. The Greeks comprised infantry (the 3rd Greek 
Brigade, comprised of approximately 3,000 infantry) 
artillery, logistical support and a hospital. The units had 
been distilled from mutinous army units. This did not 
allay Churchill’s suspicion that the remaining Greeks 
might derail his operation MANNA for a rapid entry 
into soon to be liberated Athens and deny EAM/ELAS 
control of the country. In both the situation in Italy 
and Churchill’s overall designs for Greece, Freyberg 
and Fraser were entering a period that would test their 
commitment to pursue a separate New Zealand line 
over Greece at an operational level with their frontline 
army. It would show they could be as deft at decep-
tion as the British, protective of their frontline men (as 
against those with SOE), and willing to utilize a direct 
operational Wellington-2NZEF chain of command, if 
necessary bypassing the British. Ironically, it would 
also show disunity in the New Zealand politico-military 
leadership.
100 Hammond to Edmonds, 20 June 1944, Prentice/Wickstead 
5/5, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archive (LHCMA).
101 Military Secretary 2NZEF to Army Headquarters, Welling-
ton. Captain Donald John Stott PF 20681. New Zealand 
De fence Force Personnel Archives, Trentham New Zealand 
(NZDF).
MArtyn Brown202
Welcome and Alarm
The lead up to the Greeks joining the New Zealanders 
again showed Freyberg welcoming the possibility. On 
8 August, he informed the government in Wellington 
that he had been asked to take the Greek Brigade un-
der his command. The general emphasized the benefit 
they would bring to his hard-pressed Division. In the 
latter part of 1944, it was facing diminishing morale 
and effec tiveness.102 Having the Greeks would alleviate 
the situation: ”It would mean an extra infantry brigade 
and consequent spreading of casualties.”103 Wellington 
replied four days later, agreeing to the Greeks join-
ing Frey berg. It was a short reply: “Your telegram of 
8 Au gust. War Cabinet concur in your advising the 
Com man der-in-Chief that you are prepared to have the 
Greek Brigade under your command.”104 The massive 
disruption with the Greek armed forces earlier that year 
did not generate any discussion at this point. 
The general, however, then proceeded to send a 
second communication 5 days later i.e. on 13 August 
which outlined the risks in soldiering with the Greeks 
and included a draft response for the Cabinet to send to 
him. The required return communication was politically 
saturated: 
“War Cabinet agree provisionally that you should 
help train the Greek Brigade and also take them under 
your command, but in view of the history of this force 
in the last twelve months with political difficulties and 
the military mutiny, you are to keep us informed of the 
situation, and if there is any recurrence of political dif-
ficulty you are to report it here and act on our instruc-
tions. Will you convey our good wishes to the Com-
man der-in-Chief with this message.”105 
The government had complied with the request. On 
considering the need for and contents of Freyberg’s sec-
ond telegram, the general’s actions seem either crude 
negotiating tactics or a lack of elementary political fore-
sight. The former would seem to be highly unlikely, as 
it is simply too obtuse. The lack of a rebuke from Wel-
ling ton reinforces the argument that the New Zea land 
leadership seemed willing to fall in with certain Greek 
scenarios without any discussion. 
A likely explanation for the second communica-
tion lies in the briefing Freyberg received from British 
Brigadier Hennessy, Head of the Allied Liaison Section, 
Middle East Forces, after the first telegram had been 
sent. Hennessy visited Freyberg on 9 August.106 He also 
provided a written directive concerning the Greeks. It 
contained a “warning” to expect future difficulties with 
the Greek government in exile and its general staff over 
a British refusal to their request to send a Greek head-
quarters to Italy with the Brigade. He added: “any ef-
forts by Greek Politicians to visit Greek units should be 
most strenuously resisted since it only upsets them, and 
serves no useful purpose”. George II may be permitted 
102 John McLeod, Myth and Reality, (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 
1986), pp. 77-78, 132-36. 
103 Documents relating to New Zealand’s participation in the 
Second World War 1939-45 Vol II., Telegram 423.
104 Ibidem, Telegram 424.
105 Ibidem., Telegram 425 and note, p. 397.
106 GOC Diary, 9 Aug. 1944, WAII 8/46, (ANZ).
to visit them, but only for “the purpose of presenting 
colours.” Even this would be “the subject of a high level 
decision in due course”.107 Freyberg must have seen the 
unsavoury possibilities unfolding before him. Hence, 
the second telegram with “provisional” acceptance of 
the Greeks as well as the caveat that he would be act-
ing on directions from Wellington rather than London if 
political difficulties occurred. The Italian scenario also 
showed that Fraser was leaving no latitude for British 
influence on what might happen if trouble arose. Getting 
down to such an operational level of direction shows the 
New Zealand political leadership had come to a point 
where it would, if necessary, assert its overriding au-
thority over its own forces. For the General, there were 
clearly identified risks. What is more, the anticipated 
military benefits must have diminished considerably 
when the visiting liaison officer passed on the news that 
the Third Brigade had only “existed in its present form 
for a few weeks and cannot, therefore, be compared to 
a formation which has been together as a whole for sev-
eral months.”108 The ranks of the infantry even included 
“a certain percentage” of former gunners who were in-
cluded “on their reputation of reliability rather than on 
their military qualifications.”109
Having said the above, there was still a lack of dis-
cussion. Freyberg may have been embarrassed by what 
had happened on this occasion – Hennessy arrived later 
than expected to meet with the General at his Italian 
Headquarters to give the briefing. Subsequent behav-
iour, however, would show the senior military leader’s 
behaviour extend to ignoring agreed policy. 
The Greek Brigade was in Italy a few days short of 
3 months, leaving for Greece on 7 November. During 
this time, except for a temporary change of operational 
command to the Canadians, it briefly trained with and 
fought alongside the 2NZDIV. Its commander was Co-
lo nel Thra syvoulos Tsakalotos, who would eventually 
be head of government forces during the Greek civil 
war conflicts of 1946-1949. Tsakalotos appreciated be-
ing with 2NZDIV and told the commander of the Greek 
army so.110 By the end of his Brigade’s time with Frey-
bergʼs command, Tsakalotos would recommend deco-
rations for Freyberg and fifteen of his officers.111
The Brigade was also accompanied by the 210 
British Liaison Unit (BLU) which comprised 8 offic-
ers and 230 enlisted men. Freyberg was directed that 
“all orders and instructions should be transmitted to the 
Greeks through the BLU, or at least in the presence of 
one of its officers.”112 This directive assumes a particu-
107 Extract from Notes on the Royal Greek Army issued by Allied 
Liaison Section, Middle East Forces – Dated 10th August 
44. WAII 8/76 (ANZ). This document is taken from a longer 
internal British version: Notes on the Royal Greek Army, 
WO 204/5584 (TNA). In keeping with standard practice 
the personality notes on individual Greek officers was not 
included in the version given Freyberg.
108 Ibidem.
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110 Tsakalotos to Ventiris, 8 October 1944. WAII 8/76, (ANZ). 
111 Freyberg to Tsakalotos, 13 October 1944, WAII 8/76, (ANZ). 
112 Op. cit.; Extract from Notes on the Royal Greek Army issued 
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lar significance when one considers the political intel-
ligence role the BLU played. Events were to show that 
the BLU intelligence gathering would provide senior 
British personalities such as Churchill, and his senior 
generals Alexander and Wilson, with information that 
would both affect their decision making and give rise to 
alarm. In Italy, the New Zealanders (either Freyberg or 
his temporary replacement during September while the 
Ge ne ral was in hospital recovering from a plane crash) 
facilitated the appointment of a new 2NZDIV officer, 
Lt. Col. Ted Aked, to command the BLU. The place-
ment would bring considerable political baggage.
Operations OLIVE and MANNA
Like the other allied forces in Italy, the Greeks, New 
Zea landers and Canadians were to take part in operation 
OLIVE, a grand scheme to break the German Gothic 
Line. The schedule for OLIVE was one of two being 
driven by the British. The other was a political one con-
cerning MANNA. Sometimes they touched, as with the 
Greek Brigade and New Zealanders in Italy. Although 
officially integrated with the 2NZDIV, who had already 
undertaken limited exercises with the Greeks since their 
arrival, the Brigade was pulled away and put into bat-
tle with the Canadians. The New Zealanders initially 
stayed in reserve. The separation order came from 
Oliver Leese, the commander of the British 8th Army 
who wanted the Greeks “to gain battle experience.”113 
The early use of the Greeks is clearly dictated by the 
political needs of MANNA. Churchill had been ask-
ing for updates about the Brigade since 5 September.114 
General Wilson had told him that he wanted them to be 
“blooded” first and that “If they do well I anticipate that 
it would be wise and practicable to pull them out and 
send them to Greece.”115 That is, following the mutiny, 
there was a need to gain military credibility to strength-
en the claim of the returning and British-supported 
Papandreou government that, just like the left-dominat-
ed armed resistance, they had been fighting Germans. 
The Brigade went through its first action and suf-
fered heavy casualties. Aked called in New Zealand 
support. The Greeks continued with the New Zealanders 
in their victory against the Germans at Rimini. On 21 
Sep tem ber, the mayor of the town presented a surrender 
document written in English, Greek and Italian.116 In the 
after math: “The Greeks were jubilant and signalled their 
success by hoisting flags at various points in the city.”117 
Rimini satisfied political British designs. A recently 
victorious Greek army was much more attractive than a 
mutinous one. Churchill told Wilson that “On political 
grounds there seem to be great advantages in having a 
contingent of Greek troops” for MANNA.118 In contrast, 
Freyberg thought the use of the Greeks premature, and 
113 G.W.L Nicholson, Canadians in Italy 1943-1945, (Ottawa: 
Ministry of National Defence, 1956). p. 538.
114 Churchill to Wilson, 5 Sept. 1944, CHAR 20/171/46, Chur-
chill Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge.(CP). 
115 Wilson to Churchill, 7 Sept. 1944, CHAR 20/171/84 (CP). 
116 Kay and Phillips, op. cit., ch. V. For the most detailed 
account see op. cit., Henderson, and Sinclair.
117 Kay and Phillips ,op. cit., p. 453.
118 Churchill to Wilson, 29 Sept. 1944, CHAR 20/172, (CP). 
it was something he would later privately criticize to a 
British general: “I had no intention of allowing them 
to be used offensively until they had had some further 
training.”119 Obviously, he was not within the British are-
na of political trust and only saw poor military manage-
ment, not political desirability. Whether Freyberg could, 
or would, have influenced things is also a moot point. He 
was injured in an aircraft accident and subsequently hos-
pitalised during the critical time when the Greeks went 
into battle. His temporary replacement, Steve Weir, not-
ed that the Greeks in Italy considered their New Zealand 
comrades would be joining them in the return to Greece: 
“Greek Brigade to be under command NZ Div and march 
past King George Hotel Athens.”120 There were indeed 
moves in higher circles to involve a unit of New Zea-
land ers in MANNA. In the end, it would be Aked who 
would accompany the Brigade. Subsequently, he would 
be embroiled in conspiratorial Greek politics and widely 
condemned British actions in Athens shortly following 
liberation. How he was put in that position, when New 
Zea land policy dictated otherwise, is discussed later. The 
following developments preceded the appointment.
Towards liberation – Britain courts New Zealand 
Besides the Greeks, the British were looking for other 
troops to support MANNA. General Maitland Wilson 
drafted a request to Freyberg for a contingent of up to 
300 New Zealand troops to join the British upon their re-
turn. The small number was not of consequence: “I con-
sider the popularity of New Zealand forces with [the] 
Greek civil population would have [an] advantageous 
po li ti cal effect out of proportion to the numbers sent.”121 
When the cable was eventually communicated in late 
Sep tember, it was lacking the political point.122 Wilson 
had refrained from sharing with Freyberg the motivation 
for the request. Again, Britain had not confided in the 
Do mi nion. Discussion between Churchill and his senior 
mili tary commanders during the months of August and 
Sep tember when the Greeks were with the New Zea land 
Di vi sion in Italy also shows they were preoccupied with 
secrecy over MANNA. On 6 August Churchill reminded 
his senior planners: “The utmost secrecy must enwrap 
this project.”123 Later in the same month Alan Brook, 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, suggested: “The ne-
cessity of sending troops in to take the German surren-
der would provide a better cloak to cover our action.”124
In terms of the Wilson request, Freyberg told his 
Prime Minister that: “As you know, there are several 
119 Freyberg to Beaumont Nesbitt, 28 Oct. 1944, WAII 8/76, 
(ANZ).
120 WAII 8 Item 56 (ANZ). Entry for 20 September, 1944.
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factions in Greece, all of which we are on friendly 
terms, and if we were to involve ourselves at this stage 
in support of one or other of the parties we might prej-
udice our very friendly relations with the rest of the 
Greek people.” Fraser introduced the spectre of armed 
intervention. There was: “the possibility of strife break-
ing out between various Greek factions, which might 
involve our interference.”125 Freyberg suggested, and 
the New Zealand War Cabinet subsequently con curred, 
that they decline the offer using not the po li ti cal rea-
son but the manpower constraint. Specifi cal ly, that New 
Zealand did not have the troops to spare and that there 
were “very few” of the original Greek campaign veter-
ans available.126 The British offer was declined. From 
the wording in the cablegrams, it is obvious that the 
General and politician had discussed the Greek situa-
tion during Fraser’s visit to Italy earlier in the year.
Indeed the New Zealanders had earlier indications of 
the growing probability that they would be asked to make 
a contribution to a Greek venture. Four weeks before the 
Wilson request was received and three before he had ini-
tially directed his own staff to analyse a possible contin-
gent from New Zealand127, Freyberg alerted Wellington 
to the possibility. On 21 August he cabled that he had an 
informal discussion with Harold Alexander on 6 August 
and that, “it had been suggested the NZ Division might 
be sent to garrison Greece for a short time and then go 
home.” He recommended to Fraser: “As there are many 
sides to the Greek question I feel careful consideration 
should be given before this proposal is agreed to” and 
that he wanted to know if “you wish me to keep you in 
touch unofficially with these embryo plans and if you 
wish me to give you my personal views on definite pro-
posals if and when they are made.”128 Fraser responded 
welcoming his future input and any updates.129 By the 
end of the month, in a wider discussion, Fraser also told 
Freyberg that his Division would not be providing gar-
rison troops “anywhere after the armistice” but they still 
wanted to be kept informed of any plans placed before 
the General.130 Such a general policy may have been de-
cided but it was Greece that had prompted Freyberg to 
contact Wel ling ton i.e. Austria had also been suggested 
by Alexander in their early August encounter. Greece 
was where the perceived danger lay.
There would appear to be no single incident that 
caused Freyberg to raise Alexander’s proposal 15 days 
after the event. The main political player in the Greek 
planning, Churchill, was in Italy and also visited Frey-
berg and his officers whilst there. He never went near 
the Greeks. The visit fell amongst the MANNA planning 
125 Documents relating to New Zealand’s participation in the 
Second World War. Prime Minister Fraser to General Frey-
berg, 26 Sept. 1944, Telegram 428.
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meetings131 but only after132 Freyberg told Wel ling ton 
about the informal approach by Alexander. It is possible 
that Freyberg, now having the Greeks under his com-
mand and being in the senior military command struc-
ture, realized the time of liberation was drawing closer.
Just as they had done with the attachment of the 
Greek Brigade, the New Zealand leadership had dem-
on strated an awareness of the dangers of Anglo-Greek 
dy namics. It was one of implicit neutrality. Having said 
that, further actions of Freyberg, show that what was im-
plemented was not necessarily what had been agreed to.
New Zealand sends a Military Adviser to Greece 
When Freyberg learnt the Greek Brigade was returning 
home, he approached the British with the notion that 
Aked remain with the unit. He did this indirectly and 
verbally through Aked. Beaumont Nesbitt, of the Liaison 
Section at Allied Forces Headquarters, met with Aked 
on 28 October. This was a month after the Freyberg-
Fraser exchanges about avoiding returning to Greece. 
According to the Briton, despite the New Zealand pol-
icy, Aked “tells me that you wish him to remain with 
the Brigade for a further period- at least that you are 
prepared to let him remain-until their future is more 
certain.”133 Beaumont Nesbitt’s plan was to send Aked 
to Greece for “two to three weeks at the outside.”134 In 
effect, Aked stayed with the Brigade for months includ-
ing right through the street fighting of the Dekemvriana.
Freyberg argued the continuation was necessary to 
the British because: “Aked has really been Chief of Staff 
to Tsakalotos and as such has saved them hundreds of 
casualties”.135 In Freyberg’s estimation, the British offic-
ers attached to the 210BLU were not competent enough 
in military leadership. However, given what had been 
transpired between him and the New Zealand Prime 
Minister the previous month, it is a questionable act. The 
General never shared his actions concerning Aked with 
Wellington. With Freyberg’s step a fissure had appeared 
in the New Zealand leadership over Greece. 
The Greek Brigade boarded ship for liberated Greece 
on 6 November. The New Zealand army stayed in Italy.
As indicated earlier, Ted Aked was in the December 
fighting. Before that erupted he was involved with one 
of the seminal moments in Greek post-war history – the 
emergence of a new form of the far right in the Greek 
officer corps.
New Zealand involvement in further Greek military 
intrigue
While the Greeks were fighting alongside the New Zea-
land ers at Rimini, elsewhere the British were contem-
plating the future use, and fidelity, of the two armies 
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when Greece was liberated. While New Zealand has 
been discussed above, the following focuses on the 
Greek Brigade.
Communications between Churchill, Wilson and 
Alex an der show a continued hesitancy about the loyalty 
of the Brigade to their sponsored Greek government. Fol-
low ing the success of the brigade at Rimini, Wilson, at 
Chur chill’s prompting again, ordered that the BLU (i.e. 
he did not mention Freyberg thus again showing the limits 
of British-dictated involvement but one can reasonably 
assume Aked knew as he was in charge)136 to verify the 
loyalty of the Brigade to the Papandreou government.137 
As a result, at a conference on 2 October Alexander told 
Wil son the Brigade’s loyalty was “satisfactory”.138 In 
their caution, the British obviously shared Freyberg’s 
earlier assessment to Wellington that political turmoil 
was still a possibility. Though not directly discussing the 
common risk, the two camps – Dominion and imperial 
centre – were looking out for their own interests.
New Threat from the Far Right
The renewed confidence was short-lived. Before the end 
of October, the 210BLU reported that officers from the 
brigade had been meeting with “friends and political as-
sociates” posted at the Greek Mediterranean Base and 
Training Centre (GMB&TC) in Italy and were openly 
criticising the Papandreou government, especially its 
inclusion of EAM representatives in its administration. 
Furthermore “plans for the overthrow of the present 
Greek Government have been openly discussed – the in-
tention being to set up some form of Government exclud-
ing all parties save that of the extreme Right.”139 While 
he was genuine (showing a number of undercurrents 
were at play) or simply using a ruse, the GMB&TC‘s 
Greek commanding officer, also requested an extraordi-
nary amount of ammunition (1 million rounds) to fight 
EAM and protect the Greek government.140
Wilson also let Churchill know that by 4 November 
the Brigade’s reliability had diminished to that of be-
ing “generally trustworthy” and that general Ronald 
Scobie, then implementing MANNA in newly liberated 
Greece, together with the “Greek Government [would 
screen] untrustworthy individuals as necessary on ar-
rival in Greece.”141 Scobie also sent two officers from 
Greece to investigate the conspiracy in Italy. One was 
Ted Aked, Freyberg’s appointee. He was accompanied 
by Colonel Laios of the Free Greek Army142. In this epi-
sode the New Zealander had a lesser role than Laios. 
In Italy interrogations were conducted and declara-
tions were made by the visitors about the stability of 
the Papandreou government, the irrelevance of EAM, 
EDES “or political groups of that nature” in administer-
136 Wilson to Alexander, 28 Sept. 1944, WO 214/44 (TNA).
137 Churchill to Wilson, 27 Sept. 1944, CHAR 20/172 (CP).
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140 Ibidem.
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142 Appendix A to letter of 7.11.44 Political Activities Greek 
Medn Base & Trg Centre, RGA, WO 170/3812 (TNA).
ing the country and that unity was necessary for the ben-
efit of Greece. The result was: “any hopes of effective 
action by Greek Officers on reaching Greece [had] been 
completely dispelled” and the officers “look very chas-
tened and are at least beginning to realize that there is 
no room at present in Greece for political nonsense”.143 
Genesis of IDEA
The right-wing coup attempt against Papandreou did 
not materialize; but Laios and Aked may have unwit-
tingly witnessed a moment in the gestation of the ex-
treme Greek right-wing army group IDEA (Ieros Des-
mos Ellinon Axiomatikon). This was one point in a 
major historical development that no individual party at 
the time involved could have realised. 
IDEA would evolve into a force that would affect 
Greek politics and society for decades after the war.144 In 
Italy, as part of the Aked-Laois investigation, the British 
reported that Major Karayannis of the Greek Brigade 
was “probably the leader of [the] present conspiracies” 
and was removed from the Greek camp.145 Karayannis 
would indeed eventually write about his experiences in 
IDEA, and his memoirs would provide historians with 
some material for their studies of the society.146 By ear-
ly 1946, the secret organisation was “well established 
within the officer corps”, and two members were en-
sconced in the Ministry of Defence. There, they pro-
moted the ambitions of the organisation.147 In the same 
year, it enabled former collaborators to enter the Greek 
army.148 Twenty years after the reported plot against 
George Papandreou, he and his son fell victim to forces 
partially composed of figures from IDEA.149
Aked tried to meet Freyberg during his inspection 
with Laios but the latter was in Cairo at the time.150 He 
did, however, send a number of letters from Athens.
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SOE Prepares 
External to the vision of the New Zealand leadership, 
their soldiers serving as BLOs were contributing to-
wards British intervention in Greece and engaging in 
inter-partisan politics. The earlier-mentioned recom-
men dation from Bill Jordan was concerned with plan-
ning for entry of Britain and Greek national forces (i.e. 
even tually the Greek Brigade). Implementation was 
now at hand. As the day of liberation drew closer, sup-
plies and additional special forces troops were infiltrat-
ed into still-enemy-occupied Greece. Events there again 
high lighted the divergence between what the New Zea-
land leadership was saying and what their soldiers were 
doing with SOE.
As liberation approached, and Freyberg and Fraser 
spoke of Greek factions and how they wanted to avoid 
being involved in any potential conflict, SOE operatives 
were going down a different path. Tom Barnes related 
what happened when a local ELAS group “molested 
convoys” transporting some of these supplies through 
EDES territory: “their [ELAS] liquidation became nec-
essary and was effected in four days”.151 After the war, 
Arthur Edmonds would write that, when the German 
withdrawal did eventuate: “As was expected, the great-
est trouble-spots during the withdrawal were along the 
Zervas/ELAS boundary”.152 So damning of ELAS was 
the reporting of one of the New Zealand SOE contingent 
that SOE responded with discussion of possible assas-
sination. The intended target was Ares Velouchiotis, the 
chief of the ELAS partisans: “It would almost seem that 
the most drastic SOE methods should be undertaken to 
remove him from the scene of action.”153 New Zealand 
officers were planning and working toward a post-lib-
erated Greece without EAM/ELAS domination or even 
presence, while their own Prime Minister did not want 
any regular military involvement from the Dominion in 
any conflict between the “factions” of Greece. 
Athens and Dekemvriana 
The Greek Brigade marched through Athens on 9 No-
vem ber to a tumultuous reception. Aked wrote to Frey-
berg, saying “[Colonel] Tsacolotos and personnel of 
the Brigade were obviously nervous, all wondering in 
what manner the people of the city would receive them. 
Immediately the march commenced, all doubts vanished. 
It was obvious that the arrival home was welcomed by 
the greater percentage of the people. Streets, pavements 
and buildings were crowded and it was almost impos-
sible even to hear the band.’ The entry overshadowed 
what he called the “Local Red Party””.154 Writing more 
excitedly, Brigadier Tom King, a New Zealander serving 
with the Military Liaison in Greece, wrote to Freyberg 
“I only wish you could have been here; I am sure you 
would have been proud and thrilled. To my mind it was 
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a truly incredible performance.”155 The official British 
communiqué to Wellington echoed the two New Zea-
land ers’ assessment of the Brigade’s popular arrival and 
that “EAM and Communist banners were noticeably 
absent.”156 Arthur Edmonds, one of the New Zealand 
SOE officers, witnessed the unfolding events against the 
broader political tension in the city. He considered the 
cheering crowds to be “not of the EAM-ELAS camp” 
and that “Many breathed easier in Athens that night 
feeling more secure from ELAS.”157 Subsequent events 
were to show that this was a deceptive impression and 
that his initial observation – “on entering Athens I felt 
that the place was a powder magazine which was likely 
to explode at any time”158 – was much more accurate.
The Brigade was both a bargaining point and a mili-
tary asset during the ensuing months. EAM/ELAS saw 
its disarmament, as well as that of EDES, as a neces-
sary precondition for their own disarmament. Churchill, 
even before fighting broke out in early December, how-
ever, did not appear to be pursuing his public statements 
about avoiding civil war through unilateral disarmament 
of non-government units. He told Wilson, and through 
him, Scobie, that their plan “to disarm the rightist orga-
ni sations as well as ELAS is no doubt all right in princi-
ple, … but make sure that you do not deprive yourselves 
of the support of Zervas’s people in a practical sense.” 
He added that they and the Greek Brigade should be 
confined to their camp/barracks, the Brigade being an 
“effective reserve” and that “It would be much nicer to 
win all by ourselves, but we have got to win anyway.”159 
The requirement for disarmament was an implementa-
tion of the Caserta Agreement signed in September, be-
fore liberation began, by the Greek government and the 
partisan groups. EAM vacillated over the terms of the 
disarmament provisions as the December 10th deadline 
approached. 
The Explosion
The situation had become deadlocked. On 1 December 
ELAS partisans and the EAM police were still armed. 
Six EAM ministers resigned from the Papandreou 
government. Relations deteriorated. A crowd of EAM 
demonstrators were fired upon in Constitution Square 
on the 3rd by the government police. This event was 
the catalyst for fighting to break out between ELAS 
and their Greek political enemies (initially the police, 
but then spreading to include, amongst others, the 
Greek Brigade). At first, the British were not targeted 
by ELAS (Aked pointed out as much to Freyberg in 
a letter written on 12 December160), but the situation 
soon escalated. ELAS’s strength, their increasing en-
croachment and isolation of their opponents’ posi-
tions in Athens and lack of ammunition and supplies 
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156 EA1 201/2/82 pt 2b (ANZ) Office, SECDOM to Minister of 
External Affairs, Wellington, 14 Nov. 1944 (ANZ).
157 Edmonds, op. cit., p. 241.
158 Ibidem p. 239.
159 CHAR 20/176 Churchill to Wilson, 2 December 1944 (CP).
160 WAII 8 Freyberg Papers File 76 Greek Mountain Brigade 
(ANZ) Aked to Freyberg, 12 December 1944 (ANZ).
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led Alexander to conclude that Britain and her allies 
were facing “a first class disaster”161. It is ironic that 
Alexander, who had first raised the possibility, albeit 
unofficially, of Freyberg providing a garrison force, 
had to enter Athens to make his-scene assessment in 
an armoured car, which was also fired upon. Such was 
the precarious situation. The Greek Brigade had been 
kept as a reserve, only joining battle when, as Aked re-
ported to Freyberg on 12 December, “the situation was 
completely out of control.”162 As Papandreou had not 
managed at that point to establish a new national army 
that would follow his orders, the Greek Brigade played 
a key role in the conflict. In Alexander’s opinion, the 
Greek Brigade men were the “only effective Greek 
government troops” available.163 With them, in a senior 
leadership role, was a New Zealand officer.
Reactions in Italy and New Zealand
When fighting broke out in Athens, Freyberg, according 
to his own semi-official diary, “congratulated himself 
on not being in Greece”164. Later, at a conference of his 
officers, where Greece was one of the two “main sub-
jects on the agenda”, he read out cables relating to in-
vitations to go there. These were undoubtedly the ones 
he and Fraser had discussed. Aked, was now apparently 
to be recalled. He never, in fact, did return, and he re-
mained in the fighting. Months afterwards, he told the 
New Zealand press that “I would prefer anything I have 
experienced in this war to that type of civil war.” He 
added: “I have never seen anything to equal it for vi-
ciousness. The small arms fire was terrific … I was with 
the Greek Mountain Brigade and they [ELAS] concen-
trated their fire against our barracks.”165
For some unknown reason, the return of Aked in late 
1944, just like other detached personnel like Morton 
(and implicitly the SOE operatives) in 1943, was never 
pursued with any vigour by Freyberg’s administration.
 
Protests in New Zealand
In New Zealand, Fraser was contending with major out-
cry over British actions. Many incoming protest tele-
grams excluded the Dominion from complicity but 
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8 day’s food at present rates.“ Harold Macmillan, War Dia-
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– May 1945, (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 602. Entry for 
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wanted it to make representations to Britain. Almost ex-
clu sive ly, the uproar came from the government’s con-
stituen cy i.e. Labour Party branches and trade unions. 
Fra ser would eventually tell London about these. He 
also received a petition of protest from his own soldiers 
based at Burn ham Military Camp (endorsing a state-
ment by 2nd Lieu tenant J. Denver DCM, Soviet Medal 
for Valour), which he did not tell London about.166 Ci-
vilian protest was one thing, military quite another. The 
communication about the crisis also pervaded the ad-
mi nistration’s unofficial diplomatic communication. 
Alis ter Mc Intosh, Head of External Affairs, received a 
personal letter (thought more appropriate than an offi-
cial report) from Carl Berendsen, New Zealand repre-
sen tative in Washing ton. The Washington-based diplo-
mat said that, because of British actions in Greece and 
Ita ly167: “The British Commonwealth is getting an ex-
tremely bad press here at the moment... . And on top of 
that came the Greek business, which seems to me to be 
about as bad as bad can be.”168 
Fraser’s Protest
The perception that events in Greece were being 
driven by the Commonwealth as a whole rather than 
by Britain, and Churchill’s statement in the House of 
Com mons indicating the same169, led Fraser to send a 
letter of protest to London. On December 20th he ca-
bled London that he wanted to make the position of 
New Zealand clear. He placed his main criticism in 
supportive imperialist rhetoric, but it was in effect a 
direct challenge to the key underpinning of British pol-
icy: “There is a feeling that the British Government is 
fighting to place the King of Greece safely back on his 
throne, regardless of the wishes of the Greek people, a 
cause which in the general opinion of New Zealanders, 
and an opinion which I fully share, is not worth the loss 
of the valuable life of one British soldier.”170 Fraser did 
not mention any of the Greek parties (EAM, EDES etc) 
but focused on the entity of “Greece” and touched upon 
the monarchies in Yugoslavia and Italy. He reminded 
the British that “In May last [that is, when he attended 
the Prime Ministers’ Conference] during a discussion 
with Mr Eden in London, I expressed my considered 
view that any policy to bolster up or restore the mon-
archies in Greece, Yugoslavia or Italy, or which has the 
appearance of doing so, would be a mistake of the first 
magnitude.”171 Churchill responded to Fraser two days 
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later. He did not answer the essential question of the 
monarchy (not even the possibility of a plebiscite was 
considered) but related developments around the issue 
of appointing a Regent172, the improving military situ-
ation and the need to disarm the guerrilla forces. He 
stressed that the Greek Brigade and the special forces 
Sacred Squadron should not be disarmed but might 
have to be “removed elsewhere as part of a general 
settlement.”173
The rift between New Zealand and Britain was the 
result of the outbreak of unpopular armed conflict, com-
bined with the possibility of defeat (to the British and 
their allies) and the specifics of the monarchy question. 
The Fraser government’s protest was not one voiced 
publicly. Fraser had in fact prevented discussion of the 
Greek situation in the New Zealand Parliament. His 
statement on that day did not even include any refer-
ence to Greece or to any other country liberated. The 
complexities of post-war political settlements, he said, 
were to be resolved peacefully through the mechanism 
of the United Nations. For the moment, the over-riding 
concern was to win the war “Whatever difficult situa-
tions arise in other countries, we have to reserve our 
opinions”.174 Fraser, unlike Churchill, who faced a no 
confidence vote in the House of Commons over the 
Greek situation, had a compliant political arena in Wel-
ling ton. The only public disclosure about New Zea land’s 
stance on Greek affairs was an announcement about the 
“no troops” for Greece decision made months previous-
ly.175 It was a deceptive announcement. Fraser’s claim 
that “There are no New Zealand troops in Greece176 was 
not true. Aked was there and, taking a broader view, the 
New Zealand SOE operatives had been involved in con-
tentious Greek affairs for years.
In the days following the surge of domestic protests, 
Fraser’s administration now animated by what hap-
pened, used its own informal connections to gather intel-
ligence about the turmoil in newly liberated Greece.177 
Hostilities in Greece were temporarily halted by the 
Var kiza agreement of February 1945. Two years later, 
civil war broke out again. Tsakaotos would rise to a 
senior position in the government army. In 1947, Tsa-
ka otos told Aked, who had returned to New Zealand 
some years before, that he had “to continue the struggle 
against the criminals of our country”.178 Freyberg and 
Aked maintained some communication with him up un-
til at least 1952.179 
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Summary
The ongoing New Zealand military involvement with 
Greece was both at a major unit and an individual level. 
The nature of the latter’s work and senior placement in 
a clandestine organisation counters any argument that 
the numbers involved were insignificant as against the 
backdrop of Dominion casualties in failed ventures such 
as Lustre, Mercury in 1941 and the Aegean in 1943.
One can say that, at least in terms of protecting Do-
minion interests, i.e. safeguarding the 2NZDIV, Fra-
ser and Freyberg had worked along the same path. 
Similarly, they were in unison with the plight of their 
soldiers fighting as BLOs in occupied Greece. The lead-
ership was disinterested. Both could be well pleased 
with themselves as their prediction of fighting in liber-
ated Greece had in essence proven to be correct. They 
had also been lucky in that political intrigues within the 
Greek forces in Italy had appeared after they had left 
the 2NZDIV. However, the politician and general had 
both said one thing to each other (i.e. the neutral stance) 
but done another when it came to any sense of neutral-
ity (Frey berg with Aked’s ongoing appointment, Fraser 
with his attacking the Greek monarch). At the least, 
it is an example of a civil-military relationship out of 
sync. Speaking bluntly, Freyberg’s action in Italy over 
Aked is an example of a military commander ignoring 
government policy. The general’s reaction over the out-
break of fighting in Athens shows that he was taken by 
surprise. This is at first difficult to reconcile with his 
previous statement to Fraser about fighting likely to 
break out. But their discussion revolved around “fac-
tions” (i.e. probably Greek, given there had already 
been one previous outbreak in fighting between EAM/
ELAS and EDES). What had not been foreseen was the 
escalation and involvement of British forces.
In contrast to New Zealand, the British were far 
more integrated in pursuing a common goal. Decisions 
and statements by British generals could be seen to 
come from “politicians in uniform” without too much 
effort (e.g. Wilson and his “blooding” strategy), as they 
engaged in open discussion about what they wanted to 
achieve. British cohesion versus Dominion variability 
could be explained in part by the long-established and 
resourced British politico-military structures versus a 
small diplomatic capability and still evolving maturity 
in diplomacy. However, despite this, Fraser and Frey-
berg possessed enough raw data about the risks and pre-
dicament of their military to inform intelligent discus-
sion and decision-making. That they only did this for 
their largest unit – i.e. 2NZDIV – is their limitation and 
cannot be attributed to the machinations of London; nor 
could their inability to work in unison. Perhaps the best 
that can be said is that Fraser and Freyberg eventually 
engaged in communication over Greek matters, albeit it 
was a deceptive and highly selective process. 
